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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

The American Health Care Act
Would Toss the States a Hot Potato
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor of law at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and
Darien Shanske is a professor at the University
of California Davis School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, the authors discuss potential state
responses should the Republican replacement
for the Affordable Care Act be enacted. They
write that states must begin their preparations
immediately, since they will need to quickly
close the gaps created by those federal actions.
Healthcare reform has been dominating recent
policy discussions, even more so than proposals for
tax reform. On March 6 House Republicans finally
revealed their draft bill to repeal and replace the
Affordable Care Act. That bill was subsequently
revised, with a House vote then scheduled for
March 24, before that vote was canceled because
of lack of support. The immediate news following
that canceled vote was that the Republicans would
be abandoning their goal of repealing and
replacing the Affordable Care Act. However, more
recent news stories suggest that the American

Health Care Act (AHCA) may still live, and that
House Republicans may try again to pass this bill
or something resembling it.
Because the major provisions and structure of
the AHCA may be enacted in some future
legislative effort, it is worth analyzing the
implications that this would have for state-level tax
and health policy. In this article, we argue that
passage of the AHCA in anything like its current
form would toss a hot potato to state governments
by forcing them to act promptly if they are to save
individual insurance markets in their states. This
article explains the problem so that state-level
policymakers can be prepared to act quickly if the
AHCA is passed. The most promising state
government responses to the AHCA would involve
passing new state-level taxes and subsidies. Hence,
state-focused tax policy communities should be
prepared for state governments to act.
To assess the AHCA bill, it is helpful to think of
it as consisting of four major buckets of reform:
• ending many of the ACA’s tax provisions;
• phasing in cuts to Medicaid funding and
scheduling devolution of Medicaid to the
states;
• transforming the ACA’s other major health
subsidies from being based mostly on income
and health costs to being based more on age;
and
• making other changes to the ACA’s insurance
market regulations.
This essay focuses on the fourth bucket — the
changes to the ACA’s insurance market regulations
other than the changes to subsidies. The AHCA’s
Medicaid reforms would also create challenges for
state governments, but explaining those challenges
is not the topic of this essay.
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The ACA dealt with these dynamics through
the individual mandate, actuarial value
requirements, essential health benefits
requirements, other restrictions banning barebones health plans, and risk-adjustment systems
that charge health insurance plans with less costly
pools of insureds while compensating plans with
more costly pools of insureds.3 Many argue that
these ACA measures were insufficient and that
adverse selection death spirals are beginning to
develop in at least some states.4 To the extent that is
correct, the only possible solutions are:
• some combination of toughening the
penalties for going without insurance
coverage and the restrictions on bare-bones
insurance plan offerings or implementing
stronger risk-adjustment and subsidization
mechanisms to bolster more comprehensive
insurance offerings; or
• moving away from the risk-pooling model
and toward either an actuarial fairness model
or a single-payer model.
Yet the AHCA does none of these. As noted, the
AHCA continues to rely on the risk-pooling model
by preventing insurance plans from charging more
or denying coverage to insureds with preexisting
conditions. Then, instead of strengthening the
ACA’s provisions for limiting adverse selection, the
AHCA dramatically weakens these provisions.
Most notably, the AHCA replaces the ACA’s
individual mandate with a (laughably lenient)
continuous coverage requirement5 while also
repealing the ACA’s actuarial value requirements
and — in some later versions — essential health
benefits requirements.
In other words, the AHCA would allow
healthy people to purchase cheap, bare-bones
insurance plans or to forgo purchasing insurance
altogether. Then, when these people become sick
and need greater coverage, they could switch to a

3

Id. at 683-685.

4

See, e.g., Megan McArdle, “Obamacare Isn’t Going to Fix
Itself,” Bloomberg View, Mar. 16, 2017.

1

See, e.g., Maggie Fox, “Obamacare Lite? New GOP Health Care
Bill Has Host of Critics,” NBCNews.com, Mar. 7, 2017.
2

See David Gamage, “Perverse Incentives Arising From the Tax
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are
Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income
Workers,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 669, 676-680 (2012), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067138.
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5

For discussion, see, e.g., Aaron Carroll, “The AHCA’s Mandate
Replacement Doesn’t Make Sense to Me,” The Incidental
Economist Blog (Mar. 10, 2017). Leaving aside the effectiveness of
this requirement, it may represent a change to the law that cannot
be made by means of reconciliation. See Daniel Hemel and David
Herzig, “The G.O.P. Health Care Plan’s Fatal Flaw,” The New York
Times, Mar. 16, 2017.
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What is most striking about the AHCA’s
insurance market changes is how they keep nearly
all the ACA’s reforms in place. Right-wing groups
1
have thus called the AHCA “Obamacare lite.” Yet,
in a sense, this is a misnomer. The AHCA’s changes
do not really water down the ACA’s regulations, as
the intended slur Obamacare lite implies. Rather,
the AHCA’s changes would likely cause the ACA’s
framework for regulating the individual market to
fall apart — absent countervailing actions by state
governments.
If the AHCA bill were enacted in its current
form, the result would likely be adverse-selection
death spirals. The only real hope for saving the
individual market would be for state governments
to step up with new state-level regulations for
supporting insurance markets in their state.
The AHCA retains the ACA’s bans against
insurance plans denying coverage or charging
more to people with preexisting health conditions.
This means that the individual market for health
insurance would not function based on an actuarial
fairness model, wherein people would be charged
based on their expected future healthcare costs.
Instead, the individual market would function
based on a risk-pooling model.
Any risk-pooling model for health insurance
needs mechanisms for coping with adverse
2
selection. Absent those mechanisms, healthier
Americans would likely opt for cheaper, more
bare-bones health insurance plans, or to forgo
purchasing health insurance altogether. This
would then leave more comprehensive health
insurance plans covering sicker and more costly
populations, which would lead insurance
companies to raise the prices on these plans or to
restrict the benefits that are more attractive to sick
insureds. The iteration of these dynamics generally
leads to adverse-selection death spirals that can
cause insurance markets to collapse into only barebones plans or even no plans at all.
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6

Antos and Capretta, “Republicans Should Take the Time
Necessary to Improve the American Health Care Act,” Health
Affairs Blog (Mar. 10, 2017).

a surcharge of $150 a month. Healthy
consumers are likely to take their chances,
saving that $6,000 in the hope that they
would not incur significant medical
expenses during the year. With the repeal
of the individual mandate, and the
retention of the ACA’s insurance rules, the
overall effect would be significant market
turbulence, starting immediately in 2017.
To avoid a complete collapse of the market,
the AHCA should provide a strong and
clear penalty for persons who exit the
market, covering multiple years. One
approach would be to extend the current
surcharge over several years. Another
possibility would be to impose a waiting
period before benefits would be paid.
More generally, the AHCA may not pass or
may be so substantially revised by the time it
passes so as to resolve the problems we identify in
this article. But there is a non-trivial risk of the
AHCA passing in something like its current form.
So state governments and state tax policy
communities should be prepared to act if needed.
Perhaps the most straightforward option for
how state governments could respond to the
AHCA would be to legislate state-level individual
mandates. Indeed, health law scholar Nicholas
Bagley has proposed just that. In an op-ed focused
on California, he wrote:
For 2018 and 2019, almost every part of
Obamacare except for the individual
mandate will remain intact. California can
patch that hole by replacing the individual
mandate at the state level. Call it the
Golden State Mandate.
The Legislature would have to act fast. The
substitute mandate probably would have
to be in place by the summer in order to
give insurers time to set their rates before
the start of open enrollment on Nov. 1. Even
then, the gambit might not work: Insurers
are skittish about the long-term future of
health reform. Some may head for the hills.
But the California exchange is healthy and,
with a substitute mandate in place, the
economic picture for the next two years
shouldn’t look all that different than it does
today. Instead of the premium surge that
other states will experience, California
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more comprehensive health insurance plan,
paying no penalty if they are switching from a
bare-bones plan or paying just 30 percent more for
a year if they are switching from no coverage.
This is simply not enough incentive for healthier
people to purchase more comprehensive insurance
plans from the individual market. If enacted, the
AHCA would thus result in more comprehensive
insurance plans being swamped with high-cost
insureds with expensive health conditions, which
would then create overwhelming pressure for
insurance providers to either restrict the features of
plans that appeal to high-cost insureds or withdraw
from the market altogether. To illustrate, consider
what insurance provider would want to create a
plan that offers great cancer coverage, if the result
would be to attract extremely high cost cancer
patients, without being able to either charge them
higher premiums or to otherwise be reimbursed
for their greater cost?
Were the AHCA enacted in its current form, the
best hope for saving individual insurance markets
would be for state governments to step up and pass
state-level regulations to make up for the AHCA’s
weaknesses. Nothing currently prevents state
governments from implementing their own
individual mandates; or even better, state
governments could directly subsidize exchange
plans to make the individual mandate
unnecessary, along with implementing better,
state-level risk adjustment mechanisms.
Before discussing how state governments
should respond to the AHCA, it is worth
reiterating that the AHCA is a draft bill and its
framework could be made workable without state
government action. Joseph Antos and James
6
Capretta explain one way this could be done. Their
proposed approach would involve, among other
measures, greatly increasing the continuous
coverage requirement penalties. They write:
The AHCA penalty imposed on persons
who experience a break in their insurance
enrollment of more than two months in the
prior year would be a 30 percent premium
surcharge payable for 12 months. For a
plan costing $6,000 a year, that amounts to

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

Bagley, “The GOP Obamacare Replacement Would Help the
Rich, Hurt the Poor and Unleash Chaos,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 7,
2017.
8

There have been serious efforts to establish a single-payer
system in California in the past and similar discussions have begun
again. See, e.g., Soumya Karlamangla, “With Obamacare in
Jeopardy, California Considers Going It Alone With ‘SinglePayer,’” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 26, 2017.
9

See Cynthia Cox et al., “Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk
Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors,” The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation (Aug. 17, 2016).
An alternative approach that should also be considered
would be to implement a state-level high-risk pool in a manner
designed to achieve the result of subsidizing more comprehensive
individual market plans. Maine’s experience in 2011 offers a model
for how this could be done. For discussion, see Joel Allumbaugh,
Tarren Bragdon, and Josh Archambault, “Invisible High-Risk
Pools: How Congress Can Lower Premiums and Deal With PreExisting Conditions,” Health Affairs Blog (Mar. 3, 2017).
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Will state governments be up to managing
these challenges? If the AHCA is not passed, we
may never know. If the AHCA does pass, we can
only hope. No doubt the states have bought some
time with the collapse of the AHCA repeal effort,
but this reprieve may only be temporary. There are
also indications that the administration may
undermine the ACA through administrative
action, which means that the states may end up
with the same hot potato even without formal
12
repeal of the ACA. We therefore believe that it is
crucial for state tax policy communities to begin
13
preparatory work soon. Only through such action
will state governments be able to handle the hot
potato tossed to them by the federal government
without being burned.


11

7

10

• ensuring that the overall subsidization of
exchange plans (or other individual market
plans) would be sufficient to make up for the
lack of an individual mandate;
• managing the likely erosion of employersponsored coverage that would result from
the subsidization of individual market plans
in the absence of an employer mandate;11 and
• designing anti-fraud and anti-gaming
mechanisms to limit the potential for
insurance providers to manipulate the new
programs against the public interest.

See Hemel, “The House GOP Plan and Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance: Killing It Softly?” Whatever Source Derived Blog
(Mar. 10, 2017), for preliminary analysis on this issue. See Gamage,
supra note 2, at 692-693, for a discussion of this issue under the
ACA. A major reason why federal policymakers were concerned
about the potential erosion of employer-sponsored coverage when
legislating and implementing the ACA was that it could have
dramatically driven up the budgetary cost of the exchange
subsidies. From a state government perspective, were the AHCA to
be passed and implemented, this would arguably be a plus, since
the more that state government policy shifted insureds from
employer-sponsored coverage to subsidized individual market
coverage, the larger the subsidies the federal government would
provide to the state and the stronger the state’s individual market
would likely become (at the federal government’s expense).
12

Juliet Eilperin and Mike Debonis, “Price: Trump
Administration plans to undo parts of the Affordable Care Act,”
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 29, 2017.
13

We plan to return to the topic with some ideas and
observations in a future essay.
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residents could see a more moderate
increase in premiums. At a minimum, it’s
7
worth a shot.
Bagley’s proposal for state-level individual
mandates could work, at least in theory. Yet the
individual mandate has always been among the
least popular of the provisions in the ACA
framework. Even the Obama administration was
lukewarm about enforcing the mandate and was
arguably unwilling to give it sufficient teeth. We
are thus skeptical that state governments would
have the political will to successfully implement
this approach — even in California.8
So what might state governments do instead?
The best solution would probably be to implement
state-level versions of the ACA’s reinsurance and
risk corridor programs but to make them
permanent, in contrast to their temporary,
transitional role in the ACA regulatory
9
framework. This approach would involve levying
taxes on group and self-funded health insurance
plans and on individual health plans with
healthier, lower-cost pools of insureds, and then
using these funds to compensate individual health
plans that attract higher-cost pools of insureds for
10
the excess coverage costs.
Implementing state-level reinsurance and risk
corridor programs would not be simple. Nor
would implementing any alternative approach
capable of saving individual insurance markets in
the states. Preparatory work would probably need
to be started even before the AHCA became law.
Some issues that would need to be worked through
include:

